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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a utility-based definition of binge-drinking and examines the compatibility of this phe-
nomenon with a rational decision making. Prohibition of young people’s consumption of alcohol is frequently 
violated by binge-drinking in groups. The analysis considers the roles of peer-pressure, full price of alcohol and 
crowding in underage group-drinking sessions and identifies the conditions for binge-drinking by expected util-
ity maximizing members. Rational binge-drinking occurs when the impact of the peer-pressure on the individual 
member’s utility exceeds the loss of utility from the forgone spending on all other goods associated with the ex-
pected full marginal cost of consuming alcohol. 
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1. Introduction 
The optimal level of public investment in controlling the 
prevalence of use of intoxicating substances is linked to 
the choice between prohibition and accommodation. 
Prohibition of alcohol had been decreed in several west-
ern countries during the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury, most notably the United States. It can be argued that, 
in view of the large initial proportion of regular alcohol 
consumers, prohibition has not been a socially optimal 
policy. In an earlier study (Levy et al. [1]), the co-authors 
and I have stressed the non-concavity of the Hamiltonian 
associated with the public planner’s optimal control 
problem in the number of users as giving rise to unstable 
steady states and to a certain number of users that is 
critical for determining the socioeconomically optimal 
control trajectory. Namely, only if the initial number of 
users is smaller than the critical number associated with 
the Dechert-Nishimura-Skiba point, a trajectory sup-
ported by a strong early control effort that ensures em-
barking on a path of elimination of the use of the intoxi-
cating substance under consideration is socially optimal. 
However, if the initial users’ number exceeds that critical 
number, the full costs of elimination are too high and a 
lower early public control effort that ensures embarking  
on the stable manifold to the saddle point steady state 
with a large number of users is optimal. 
Prohibition has become socially undesirable as boot-
legging and organised crime took control of the supply of 
alcohol. Consequently, it was replaced by accommoda-
tion, but with a minimum-age restriction. As juveniles 
mature in different pace, there is not a physiologically 
uniform optimal minimum age of drinking. Aged-based 
prohibition has been applied with a significant variation 
of the minimum age across countries: as low as sixteen in 
several European countries and as high as twenty-one in 
the United States. Despite the implementation of mini-
mum age restrictions on alcohol consumption, binge- 
drinking by groups of young people has been a prevalent 
phenomenon and a major cause for accidents, aggression 
and, consequently, injuries and fatalities (cf. CASAC [2] 
and Courtney and Polich [3]). There have been claims 
that lowering the relatively high minimum legal age of 
drinking in the United States can reduce alcohol con-
sumption and its harms. Carpenter and Dobkin [4] have 
found that the available data do not support those claims. 
Restrictions encourage formation of groups that facili-
tate their violation. The focus of this theoretical paper is 
on the possible link between underage binge-drinking 
and participation in a group-drinking session. The paper 
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considers aspects of affiliation to a group of alcohol 
consumers that are relevant to the investigation of 
whether binge-drinking can be an outcome of a decision 
making that is oriented to maximize the individual 
members’ expected utility. A confirmation may reflect 
the difficulty in controlling the prevalence of alcohol 
abuse and its harms. In other words, if binge-drinking 
can be prevalent within a group of expected utility max-
imizing underage consumers, it can be expected to be 
more intensive within a group of underage alcohol con-
sumers who evaluate the expected benefits and costs of 
drinking in a less rational manner. 
On the one hand, affiliation to a drinking group mod-
erates the personal price of alcohol for the underage in-
dividual members. In addition to the acquisition cost, the 
personal price of alcohol includes the moral costs of 
breaking the law and the costs of risk-bearing stemming 
from possible involvement in accidents and violent ex-
change. Naturally, the larger the group, the greater is its 
bargaining power as well as its ability to provide moral 
support, care and protection to members. That is, the size 
of the group lowers the personal price of alcohol and, 
ceteris paribus, increases the quantity of alcohol de-
manded by the members. 
Yet, as demonstrated in the ensuing sections, the mod-
erating effect of group on personal price cannot by itself 
prove binge-drinking to be rational in the said von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern sense. The individual member’s level 
of alcohol consumption might be further intensified by 
peers’ expectations of displaying good-drinking com-
panionship. The paper demonstrates the crucial role of 
the individual utility’s sensitivity to such peer pressure in 
rendering binge-drinking as a possible rational choice.  
On the other hand, an income effect should be taken 
into account. Due to intoxication there can be a negative 
relationship between earning and alcohol consumption. 
In addition, crowding increases the probability of being 
noticed by law-enforcers and, consequently, fined. 
To set the stage for the analysis of the group’s overall 
effect on rational members’ consumption of alcohol, 
Sections 2 and 3 consider the case of solitary drinkers 
(i.e., individuals whose utility is not affected by external-
ities that could have been generated by shared-drinking 
sessions) in a society free of age restrictions on alcohol 
consumption. In particular, Section 2 offers a formulation 
of the utility from alcohol and, subsequently, a util-
ity-based definition of binge drinking and Section 3 pro-
vides a relationship between earnings and consumption 
of alcohol and, consequently, the budget for all other 
goods. These preliminary formulation and analysis lead 
to the conclusion that, at any age, binge-drinking is not 
optimal for a lone rational drinker.  
Section 4 formulates the effects of minimum-age re-
striction and participating in underage group-drinking 
sessions on members’ expected utilities and, subse-
quently, identifies the conditions for rational binge- 
drinking. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Utility-Based Definition of Binge-Drinking 
To provide a utility-based definition of binge-drinking let 
us consider a setting where the individual’s utility from 
consuming alcohol is not tainted by external effects; 
namely, drinking in solitary. The formulation of the util-
ity from consuming alcohol in solitary at any given age is 
based on the following assumptions. A week is the rele-
vant unit of time as it is neither too short, nor too long, 
for recording the individual’s cycle of drinking, work, 
study and consumption of other goods and services. The 
individual’s weekly cycle commences with drinking in a 
private session that starts, say, on Saturday night and 
finishes by early Sunday morning. During the rest of the 
week the individual refrains from consuming alcohol 
(due to work, care and/or study duties). By the next Sat-
urday night the individual is fully recovered from the 
adverse effects of alcohol.  
The individual’s alcohol consumption in the weekly 
session at t years of age ( )tc  has an age-dependent tol-
erance upper-bound ( )tc , which indicates her/his inca-
pacitating intake at that particular age. Reaching this 
tolerance upper-bound nullifies the individual’s produc-
tivity and, in turn, income and spending on goods ser-
vices during the following seven days. The consumption 
of alcohol might also directly decrease the individual’s 
utility from some goods and services and increase the 
utility from others. As the aggregate direct effect is not 
clear, and for simplicity, overall neutrality is assumed 
and displayed by separability between the utility from 
alcohol and the utility from all other goods and services. 
That is, at any age t, the individual’s (overall) weekly 
utility ( )tu  is equal to the sum of the weekly utility 
from alcohol ( )atu  and the weekly utility from all other 
goods and services ( )gtu :  
a g
t t tu u u= + .              (1) 
The weekly utility from alcohol is taken to be equal to 
the difference between the pleasure from drinking and 
the discomfort associated with intoxication (loss of mus-
cle coordination, drowsiness, nausea, etc.). At suffi-
ciently low levels of consumption, the t-year old indi-
vidual’s marginal pleasure from drinking exceeds the 
marginal discomfort. But while the marginal pleasure 
diminishes with the consumed quantity of alcohol, the 
marginal discomfort is increasing and eventually be-
comes dominant. At a certain consumption level, t̂c , 
within the physiologically feasible range ( )0, tc  the 
marginal discomfort is equal to the marginal pleasure, 
rendering the marginal weekly utility from alcohol to be 
zero. This property can be captured by the following 
analytically convenient specification: 
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2a
t t t t tu c cα β= −               (2) 
where the age-dependent coefficients are such that 
0t tα β> > . This specification can be viewed as a sec-
ond-order approximation of a general, single-peaked, 
function of weekly utility from alcohol: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 20 0 0.5 0a a a at t t t t t tu c u u c u c′ ′′+ +  
with ( )0 0atu = , ( )0 0atuα ′= >  and 
( )0.5 0 0atuβ ′′− = < . As ( )ˆ 0at tu c′ = , ˆ 2t t tc α β=  and, 
consequently, ˆ0.5t t tcβ α= . In turn, Equation (2) can 
be expressed as: 
( )2 ˆ0.5at t t t tu c c cα  = −  .          (3) 
Since 0atu
′   as ˆt tc c , then (from the perspective 
of generating weekly utility from alcohol per se) t̂c  is 
the individual’s bliss intake of alcohol in a weekly 
drinking session at t-years of age. Consumption of alco-
hol beyond t̂c  is excessive and represents binge-drink- 
ing. In contrast to the rule of thumb that regards con-
sumption beyond four shots, in the case of females, and 
five shots, in the case of males, as binge-drinking 
(Courtney and Polich [3]), this proposed definition is 
sensitive to individual variations. The intensity of binge- 
drinking can be measured by ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ 0,1t t t tc c c c − − ∈   
for any ( )ˆ ,t t tc c c∈ . 
3. Income Effect and Solitary Consumption  
of Alcohol in the Absence of  
Age Restrictions  
The consumption of alcohol reduces productivity and, 
consequently, the budget available for buying goods. Let 
us take all other goods as an aggregate, 0p >  the rela-
tive price of alcohol and tI  the individual’s weekly 
income, or performance-based allowance given by par-
ents in the case of non-working adolescents. For simplic-
ity, the individual’s marginal weekly utility from spend-
ing on all other goods ( )t tI pc−  is taken to be constant, 
but can be age dependent ( )0tγ > . The individual’s 
current weekly income is assumed to decline from an 
alcohol-free age-dependent level, ftI , proportionally to 
the individual’s degree of incapacitation by alcohol, i.e., 
( )1 ft t t tI c c I= − . Hence, the individual weekly utility 
from all the other (non-alcoholic) goods is: 
( )1g ft t t t t tu c c I pcγ  = − −  .         (4) 
Recalling Equations (1), (3) and (4), the weekly utility 
of a solitary consumer of alcohol is: 
( ) ( )2 ˆ0.5 1 ft t t t t t t t t tu c c c c c I pcα γ   = − + − −   .  (5) 
A rational t-year old solitary person sets tc  to maxi-
mize her/his weekly utility. The first-order condition for 






t t t t t t
t
c
u p c I
c
α α γ  ′ = − − + =  .      (6) 
As the second-order condition is satisfied ( )ˆ 0tcα− < , 
the optimal weekly alcohol consumption in solitary for a 












= − +  
   
.          (7) 
Proposition 1. A rational person who drinks alone 
does not binge. 
Proof: From Equation (7), * ˆt tc c≤  as 0
f
t tp I c+ ≥ . 
At any age, the individual’s utility maximizing con-
sumption of alcohol in solitary is lower than her/his cur-
rent age bliss intake by a proportion that is equal to the 
product of the full price of alcohol ( )ft tp I c +   and the 
relative marginal utility from all other goods ( )t tγ α . 
Even when alcohol is freely available, a rational person 
drinks in solitary less than t̂c  as long as drinking has an 
adverse effect on her/his earning ability.  
4. Minimum-Age Restriction, Group  
Influence and Alcohol Consumption 
The analysis presented in the previous section suggests 
that rational people do not binge-drink in solitary. It is 
demonstrated in this section that this outcome does not 
necessarily prevail when they face a binding minimum- 
age restriction and, as frequently observed, drink in 
groups. The present section incorporates the effects of 
minimum-age restriction and groups into the formulation 
of the expected utility function of underage consumers of 
alcohol and identifies the conditions for rational under-
age people to binge-drink.  
As in the previous section, a weekly cycle is consid-
ered with a drinking session that starts on Saturday night 
and finishes on early Sunday morning and, therefore, 
affects the participants during the following seven days. 
But now the drinking session is shared with similarly 
under-aged companions and the participants are facing a 
risk of being noticed by law-enforcers and, subsequently, 
punished.  
In addition to the direct satisfaction from consuming 
alcohol, a person who participates in a group-drinking 
session can gain (loose) utility from increased (dimin-
ished) reputation of being an invaluable drinking com-
panion proportionally to the product of the deviation of 
her/his alcohol consumption from an expected minimum 
norm, 0etc > ,and the relative size of the group of the 
rest the drinking-session’s members: 
( )( )( )1 et t t t t tR r n n c c= − −          (8) 
where 0tr ≥  is an age-dependent coefficient, tn  is the 
largest possible group of affiliation for the underage un-
der consideration, and tn  is a predetermined number of 
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the drinking-session’s members. In this specification, 
1tn −  indicates the number of drinkers accompanying 
the individual under consideration, ( )0 1 1t tn n≤ − <  
indicates the intensity of peer pressure and tr  the sensi-
tivity of the individual’s weekly utility to peer pressure. 
There are other disadvantages and advantages from 
drinking in group. On the one hand, the probability of 
being noticed by law enforcers and, in turn, punished, 
increases with crowding—namely, the number of com-
panions. With 0 1tϕ< <  denoting the probability of 
being noticed by law-enforcers for the largest possible 
group of t-year old underage drinkers, the probability of 
being noticed for a t-year old underage drinker in a group 
of t tn n≤  is ( )t t tn nϕ . Since similarity to eligible-age 
consumers increases with age, it is possible that tϕ  di-
minishes as t converges to the minimum age. The pun-
ishment for drinking is assumed to be a fine that is pro-
portional to the level of alcohol consumption: t tcµ , 
where 0tµ ≥  is an age-dependent fine per unit of alco-
hol. The underage alcohol consumer expects a portion 
0 1tε≤ ≤  of the fine to be borne by her/his parents, de-
pending on their degree of leniency. 
On the other hand, affiliation to a group reduces the 
personal price of alcohol for the underage individual 
consumer. The larger the group, the greater are its bar-
gaining, supportive, caring and protecting capabilities. 
We assume that the personal price of alcohol for a group 
member is ( )1 st t t tn n pθ −  , where stp  is the personal 
price of alcohol for alone t-year old person facing age 
restrictions and 0 1tθ< < . Due to limited access to al-
cohol, stp p> . Yet, it is possible that 
s
tp  decreases 
and tθ  increases with t. 
In view of these assumptions and Equation (5), the 
distribution of the underage consumer’s weekly utility is:  
 
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )( )




1 1 1      
ˆ0.5 1
1 1                             1
e
t t t t t t t t t
f s
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t e
t t t t t t t t t
f s
t t t t t t t t t t t t
c c c r n n c c
c c I n n p c c n n
u
c c c r n n c c
c c I n n p c n n
α
γ θ ε µ ϕ
α
γ θ ϕ
  − + − − 
  + − − − − − = 
 − + − −  
  + − − − − 
             (9) 
and her/his expected weekly utility is: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )




t t t t t t t t t t
f s
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
E u c c c r n n c c
c c I n n p c n n c
α
γ θ ϕ γ ε µ
 = − + − − 
 + − − − − − 

.                  (10) 
A rational, in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense, underage person chooses an alcohol intake in the weekly group- 
drinking session that maximizes her/his expected weekly utility. As ( )tE u  is concave in tc , that underage’s optimal 
alcohol consumption must satisfy the following necessary condition: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆ1 1 1 1 0o f st t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tc c r n n c I n n p n nα γ γ θ ϕ ε µ   − + − − − − − − =   .          (11)  
Consequently, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
ˆ1
s s f
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t to
t t
t
r n n p n n p I c
c c
γ θ ϕ γ ε µ γ
α
   − + − − − +    = +
 
 
.                 (12) 
As indicated earlier, the size of the drinking group is taken to be exogenous: namely, the underage person under con-
sideration neither has the power to form her/his own group, nor the opportunity to select one from a set of groups with 
variable size. Of course, a rational person joins an existing group of 1 0tn − >  veteran members, or quit her group of  
1tn >  members, if, and only if, ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1o ot t t t t tE u c n E u c n> − =   is larger, or smaller, than zero, respectively.  
As shown in the Appendix, 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }( )
( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } ( )
( ) ( ) ( )2 2
1 1
ˆ1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ0.5 1 1
o o
t t t t t t
o e f
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
s o s o
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
o o
t t t t t t
E u c n E u c n
r n n c n c I c r n n n n c
n n p n n c n n p n c n
c c n c n
α γ ϕ γ ε µ α
γ θ ϕ ε µ γ θ ϕ ε µ
α
> − =
      = − > − + − − − − −      
   − − + − > + − + − =   
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where ( )1ot tc n >  is given by Equation (12) and  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
ˆ1 1
s s f
t t t t t t t t t t t to
t t
t
p n p I c
c n c
γ θ ϕ γ ε µ γ
α
   − − − +    = = +
 
 
.                    (14) 
Proposition 2. 
1) If tr  is greater (smaller) than ( )1 st t t t t tpγ ϕ ε µ θ − −  , then a rational underage person consumes a larger 
(smaller) quantity of alcohol in group-drinking sessions than in seclusion. (Straightforward from comparing the 
right-hand side of Equation (12) when 1tn >  to that when 1tn = ). 
2) If ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }1 1 1 s ft t t t t t t t t t t t t t tr n n n n n n p I cγ ϕ ε µ θ − > − + − +  , then a rational underage person 
binge-drinks in group-drinking sessions (Straightforward from Equation (12)). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Rational binge-drinking presents a strong cognitive ob-
stacle to overcome alcoholism. The paper considers as-
pects of affiliation to a group of alcohol consumers that 
are relevant to the investigation of whether binge-drink- 
ing can be an outcome of an individual member’s deci-
sion making that is oriented to maximize her/his ex-
pected utility. The first part of Proposition 2 reveals that 
switching from solitary drinking to drinking in company 
does not necessarily increase the alcohol consumption of 
a rational underage person. Her/his alcohol consumption 
can be reduced by participating in group-drinking ses-
sions if the sensitivity of her/his utility to peer pressure is 
smaller than the difference between the forgone utility 
from spending on other goods associated with the inten-
sifying marginal effect of crowding on the expected self- 
financed fine and the utility gains from spending on other 
goods associated with the moderating marginal effect of 
the group’s bargaining power on the price of alcohol. 
The second part of Proposition 2 says that, unlike ra-
tional consumption of alcohol in solitary, rational con-
sumption of alcohol in company can exceed the personal 
bliss level. As 0 1tθ< <  and 0 1t tn n< ≤ , 
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 0s ft t t t t t t t t t tn n n n p I cϕ ε µ θ − + − + >  . 
That is, the moderating effect of the bargaining power of 
the group cannot by itself lead rational members of a 
drinking session to binge-drink. Rational binge-drinking 
occurs when the impact of the peer-pressure on the indi-
vidual’s weekly utility exceeds the loss of utility from the 
forgone spending on all other goods associated with the 
expected full marginal cost of alcohol which, in addition 
to the full price in the absence of age restrictions, in-
cludes the self-financed portion of the marginal expected 
fine. Peer-pressure, compounded by sensitivity of the 
individual’s weekly utility to such a pressure, and suffi-
ciently low marginal utility from spending on all other 
goods are essential for underage binge-drinking to be 
rational. The critical sensitivity ( )tr  to peer pressure 
required for a rational binge-drinking to take place de-
creases with the expected portion of the fine to be borne 
by the parents ( )tε , the moderating effect of the group’s 
bargaining power on the purchasing price of alcohol 
( )tθ  and the individual’s tolerance to alcohol ( )tc , and 
increases with the probability of being noticed by law- 
enforcers ( )( )t t tn nϕ , the ratio of the fine to the intake 
of alcohol ( )tµ , the alcohol-free (potential) weekly 
earning ( )ftI , and the marginal weekly utility from all 
other goods ( )tγ . 
There may be a positive relationship between sensitiv-
ity to peer pressure and age during adolescence. The un-
derlying rationale is that being initially responsive to 
parents’ and/or educators’ expectations, adolescents may 
become more and more sensitive to friends’ expectations 
at the passage of years. The existence of such a relation-
ship can be manifested by a greater prevalence of binge 
drinking within older cohorts of adolescents. 
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Appendix 
From Equation (10), 
2
( ( ( 1))) [ (( 1) / ) ] { (( 1) / ) / [1 ( / )]
ˆ( / )(1 ) } (0.5 / )
o f e f s
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
o o
t t t t t t n t t n
E u c n I r n n c r n n I c n n p
n n c c c
γ α γ γ θ
γ ϕ ε µ α






1 1ˆ( ( ( 1))) { / [1 (1/ )] (1/ )(1 ) } (0.5 / )
o f f s o o




( ( ( 1))) ( ( ( 1))) (( 1) / ) { (( 1) / ) / [1 ( / )]
ˆ( / )(1 ) } { / [1 (1/ )] (1/ )(1 ) } (0.5 / )[ ]
o o e f s
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
o f s o o o
t t t t t t n t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t n
E u c n E u c n r n n c r n n I c n n p
n n c I c n p n c c c c
α γ γ θ
γ ϕ ε µ α γ γ θ γ ϕ ε µ α
> − = = − − + + − − − −
− − − − − − − − − −
 
. 




( ( ( 1))) ( ( ( 1))) [( 1) / )]( ) [ / ]( ) {[1 ( / )]
ˆ( / )(1 ) } {[1 (1/ )] (1/ )(1 ) } (0.5 / )[ ]
o o o e f o o s
t t t t t t t t t n t t t t t n t t t t t
o s o o o
t t t t t n t t t t t t t t t t n
E u c n E u c n r n n c c I c c c n n p
n n c n p n c c c c
α γ γ θ
ϕ ε µ γ θ ϕ ε µ α
> − = = − − + − − − −
+ − + − + − − −
 
. 
From Equation (12), 
[ ( 1) / (1 ) ]( / ) [ ( / )] ˆ( 1) 1
s s f
o t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t
t
r n n p n n p I c
c n c
γ θ ϕ γ ε µ γ
α
 − + − − − +




[ (1 ) ](1/ ) [ ( / )] ˆ( 1) 1
s s f
o t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t
t
p n p I c
c n c
γ θ ϕ γ ε µ γ
α
 − − − +




[ ( 1) / (1 ) ](( 1) / ) ˆ( 1) ( 1)o o t t t t t t t t tt t t t
t
r n n n n
c n c n c
ϕ γ ε µ
α
 − − − −
> − = =  
 
. 
 
